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In the twenty-first century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their future prosperity… the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages.
?George Bush 1 The end of the Cold War created opportunities for monumental shifts in the alignment of nations. No longer was world alignment seen based on two competing spheres of influence.
This loosening of geostrategic hegemony by two super powers ushered in a period of hope and uncertainty. There was great hope for a peace dividend on the part of the United States and its European allies, while the states of the former Soviet Union looked inward to attempt to resolve crushing domestic problems. Military forces were downsized, defense budgets were cut, and doctrine was revised. Former communist and developing nations, no longer constrained by the coercive power of superpower interests, began journeys of self determination for which they were unprepared both socially and economically.
The idealist school championed that the world would become safer, more harmonious and that fledgling democracies would flourish. The realist actuality proved fundamentally different.
Heretofore ignored or stifled factors of ethnic, racial or religious strife blossomed into full intolerance. A lack of effective liberal justice mechanisms or a public recognition of the rule of law allowed oppressive regimes or criminal forces to become dominant in some nations or states. Command economies or historical barter economies were unable to modernize sufficiently to enter the world economy on an even footing or even to meet the basic needs of the populace. Not coincidentally during this period the burgeoning effects of globalization put tremendous strain on what fragile economic frameworks existed in these same nations.
Collectively, the major nations looked inward and focused attention on domestic and economic priorities rather than on international engagement. The United Nations became the dominant forum for debates about assistance or intervention in failing states. Although expansive with rhetoric about assisting nations, the powers of the world failed to actively ascertain the scope of the problems developing in failing states. In many instances regional politics worked at cross-purpose to allowing early resolution or preventive intervention.
The results are now clear, a near pandemic in increased violence and incapacity to foster peaceful and productive environments for a large portion of the world's population. The most egregious situations are well known -Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo.
WEAK OR FAILING NATIONS PROVE UNABLE TO ESTABLISH INSTITUTIONS FOR PEACEFUL GOVERNANCE.
The end of the Cold War ushered in a period of international fragmentation. The previous bipolar structure provided some measure of stability (or indifference) for nearly all nations.
Nations who had survived within the cocoon of super power influence now had to transform themselves into independent members of the international community. Many succeeded, however many more proved unable to meet the challenge. This fragmentation of international order begot what we now call a process of retribalization, during which deep-seated allegiances of ethnicity, religious fundamentalism, and nationalism are asserted. These divisions coupled with fragile economies and weak or fledgling governments produce societies that fracture and more often than not descend into violent conflict 2 .
CRISES AND INTERVENTION BECOME THE NORM
The effects of retribalization dramatically increased the number of areas in conflict or crisis throughout the world. The majority of these crisis situations are not between nations, but rather within the confines of recognized territorial boundaries of existing nations or states. The spectrum of crisis ranges from a need for humanitarian assistance to full scale armed combat between belligerent factions. What generally characterizes these crises is an incapacity to resolve the problem internally, which leads to an outside intervention by other countries to seek a resolution of conflict. As a whole we consider these actions smaller scale contingencies (SSCs). There are now 192 countries in the United Nations, over the last decade there have been nearly an equal number of interventions worldwide. Since 1993, the United States military has been involved in over 175 of these SSCs.
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To say that the United Nations and great powers were unprepared to deal with the proliferation of these crises is an understatement of considerable consequence. The human toll in the last decade in these conflicts is over 8 million persons killed and another 4 million displaced. 4 As mentioned previously, while much rhetoric may have been expended, insufficient resources were applied to resolve these situations until such time as an international crisis was perceived.
A consequence of this delayed response syndrome was an astonishing proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that organized to tackle particular issues. It is estimated that over 20,000 NGOs now exist, each organized to take on their particular cause, e.g. land mine removal or hunger relief. Some of these NGOs are regional; others are international in scope. NGOs often take up the slack in those areas that are not deemed critical enough for international action, however these NGOs may often be a hindrance in crises with a high level of violence.
NATION BUILDING IS AN IMPERATIVE TO ESTABLISH PEACEFUL GOVERNANCE
What is nation building? An exhaustive search through the Internet, various governmental databases, online dictionaries and thesaurus, and military databases yields no definition. It seems to be one of those terms that everyone understands yet no one can define. One can find examples that worked, and point to failures as well. Any definition also rests on the individual terms of reference that one uses to define a functioning capable society. Our military doctrine refers to nation assistance, but this is an activity that assumes an invitation to help is requested, which certainly is not the case in most of the areas in which we are now engaged in nation building activities. For the purpose of this paper, nation building is the sum of activities undertaken diplomatically, economically, militarily, and informationally to bring a failed state or nation to a position of independent capability to provide for its people in terms that are clearly understood by the international community. To whit, a peaceful society based on a respect for the rule of law, with a respect for human rights and political freedom, with a functioning representative government, sustainable economy, and safe basic infrastructure.
The primary dilemma that confronts the world today is a necessity to establish governments in areas of conflict that are able to provide peace, stability, and meet the basic human needs for health and prosperity. Building national governments that have the capacity to meet the needs of the populace is often a daunting task. Many factors affect the capacity of each government to successfully achieve this objective. Incapacity to govern may stem from geographical, natural, and physical factors. Other countries face historical and political circumstance, cultural traditions that reject modernization, or multiethnic traditions that must be reconciled before an effective form of government can take hold. Most devastating though is the effect of destructive decisions by corrupt leaders. The common thread for all these troubled states and for the international community is that failure to act or assist more often than not leads to a downward spiral that devolves into internal anarchy and violence. To some extent, the spillover effect from each resulting conflict jeopardizes the stability of the international order as a whole.
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The range of available options to deal with these areas of conflict is as varied as the conflicts themselves. The entire range of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic options may be employed. In many areas the problems are related to a lack of natural resources, infrastructure, education, and modernization to support economic advancement. In these cases there are numerous international resources available to provide assistance. Military ground forces are the essential ingredient to establish the conditions for success for nation building in societies in conflict or those societies that have stabilized toward postconflict. 8 Military ground forces provide the necessary coercive power to convince unlawful or criminal factions to cease hostilities as a minimum and at best to cease illegal activities. This requirement is well understood internationally. Some countries such as Canada and Belgium have dedicated a significant part of their armed forces to perform peacekeeping duties. The
European Union is exploring creation of an integrated peacekeeping force.
Given the current state of international affairs, the war on terrorism, and the potential number of failing states, the necessity for interventions to establish governing systems based on rule of law seems self-evident. Furthermore, the body of experience tells us that this will in most cases only be established through the employment of military ground forces.
NATION BUILDING IS ESSENTIAL FOR UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY
The events of September 11, 2001 taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.
? George W. Bush However, history prior to the war in Vietnam illustrates substantial use of our military forces to accomplish tasks other than war fighting. 14 The experience at the close of World War II in establishing military governments to rebuild Germany and Japan was pivotal in the success of the Marshall Plan and in establishing stable governments in these countries. In fact, the Army began developing doctrinal guidance for post conflict governance as early as 1940. 15 Over the intervening decades these doctrinal underpinnings quietly faded from doctrinal publications. 16 To say that the U.S. is without doctrine on the subject is incorrect. After the Cold While it provides a comprehensive discussion of many facets associated with engagement and to some extent nation building, it offers scant guidance on the actual tasks necessary to be successful. These documents tend to focus on the aspects of warfighting associated with conflict termination. However, the majority of nation building requirements occur in a post conflict environment. The depth of doctrine on post conflict operations is limited. The term of reference most often used to describe post-conflict or non-combat nation building activities is engagement (which is an unacceptable term for the current national administration).
Basically there are three broad tasks that must be accomplished by the military to establish the conditions for successful nation building. These tasks provide the framework for the objective ends towards which the military must apply its ways and means. First and absolutely essential is the establishment of the rule of law as discussed in detail in the previous sections. Providing security and stability for the society must occur before other tasks can be successfully concluded. Second is the rebuilding or reestablishment of essential infrastructure, services and governmental functions. This area encompasses tasks such as: delivery of water and food, safety inspections of damaged facilities, developing a police force, establishing job programs, starting schools, and developing local and national government functions. The military may provide direct assistance for several of these, or secondary assistance through security that allows functions to restart. The third broad task area is handing off functions to other governmental agencies from the United States, the United Nations, International
Organizations (IO), or NGOs and then to redeploy military forces. 18 This broad task outline forms a continuum along which many individual tasks will occur sequentially, in parallel, or overlapping of each other.
The imbalance in current American military resources stems primarily from a reluctance to acknowledge the requirements necessary to conduct nation building. Without formal acknowledgement of the mission, resources are not reallocated or developed. 19 This reluctance causes an ad hoc approach in defining and applying the organizational elements needed to achieve post conflict success, which in turn serves to exacerbate operational tempo issues. The ability to effect handoff of nation building activities at the strategic and operational level of action is another critical area that the United States military forces are not well prepared to execute.
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Embracing the requirements for nation building would be a first step in correcting the imbalance of ways and means. While this paper uses the term liberally, all of our current national policy statements, military doctrine, or senior officials studiously avoid mentioning the term. In fact no comprehensive definition of nation building is evident in our publications, as if defining the term would give it operational significance. 21 Providing a doctrinal basis for the term would begin the development of a capability based assessment of the military requirements needed to achieve success.
BALANCING MILITARY CAPABILTY FOR NATION BUILDING REQUIREMENTS
The Army tends to stay. GEN John Keane
The fundamental question that must be asked is what element of military power is most appropriate to accomplish a mission such as nation building. The Army in nearly all cases is the element of U.S. power that is most capable of establishing the conditions to begin effective nation building efforts within a failed nation or warring states. 22 Why the Army? The basic roles and functions of the services dictate that nation-building requirements will default to the Army.
The other services provide power projection of an expeditionary nature; by design they do not have the necessary force structure to accomplish most nation building tasks. The Army by Title X, U.S. Code is directed to provide the capability for long-term power projection, sustainment, and occupation. The Army's Wartime Executive Agency Requirements essentially charge it with providing and managing the sustainment of large-scale land operations for all services. 23 The
Army by design has the force structure elements to accomplish the majority of tasks inherent in nation building.
This is not to say that other services can not or should not participate in deployments to support nation building. Marine forces provide a robust capability to establish security or stability within an area of operations, however they are not structured to provide the long-term sustainment tasks required for nation building. Naval forces provide an essential element of NGOs, IOs, and the leaders of the assisted nation? This paper will look at these three issues and provide recommendations to remedy the imbalance of ways and means.
MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR NATION BUILDING
Military doctrine changes, or should change, as the nature of warfare and the specific threat to a nation changes…The relationship between military doctrine and a national security strategy is highly complex. In principle, a military doctrine exists to support the national security strategy.
In practice, implementing and changing a military doctrine is a highly complex and time consuming activity that can take years or decades, and hence the same military doctrine is often used to attempt to support radically different security strategies. To say that our doctrine does not cover nation building is inaccurate, rather our doctrine is not coherently focused on the myriad requirements and the time phasing of these tasks as a principal mission set. The Army is the executive agent for most of the doctrinal areas that pertain to the tasks and requirements that fall within the broad realm of nation building.
The overall framework of our doctrine is based on conducting operations to assure Two of these mission essential tasks (the first and last) address some aspect of nation building. The first task is to shape the security environment, which is based around the idea of engagement with other nations on a military basis to foster stability. These actions are called peacetime military engagement -designed to complement a Combatant Commander's theater engagement plan. The disconnect with nation building requirements is that seldom will they occur in a peacetime environment, but rather in a post conflict phase. The last task is to provide support to civil authorities, which follows from the joint requirements. The manual devotes just one paragraph to describe this task (para 1-23), and like the joint doctrine it is abbreviated in its description of the probable long term involvement that is often required, merely saying "Army forces continue sustained support until civil authorities no longer require military assistance."
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FM 3-0, Chapter 9 discusses Stability Operations. The chapter provides information on many of the types of operations that could occur in an effort to conduct nation building. The recognition that many of these efforts will last indefinitely is highlighted in paragraph 9-3 which states, "The US strategy of promoting regional stability by encouraging security and prosperity means Army forces will be engaged in stability operations for the foreseeable future." Our forward deployed presence in Korea is a good example of a stability operation primarily, but one in which commanders focus on the aspects of offensive and defensive operations. Bosnia is primarily an occupation force that just enforces local peace, and relies on contractors or other agencies to conduct nation building activities. US forces have now been deployed longer in Bosnia in such a role than they were in Germany following World War II.
The fundamental issue with our doctrine is that the nature of the threats to US national security has changed since these doctrinal philosophies were implemented. The competing yet also mutually supporting issues of homeland defense, the war on terrorism and essentially occupational demands of Afghanistan and Iraq require a reassessment of our mission essential tasks. The types of action and their scope required under the stability umbrella will continue to evolve and consume greater resources that most heavily fall in the realm of personnel and time deployed.
The prolonged requirements of the ongoing stability and peacekeeping missions to which the US is committed have prompted calls for a reassessment of our doctrine. 34 The US Army focus on warfighting leads to a conviction to stop conflict and then redeploy as soon as feasible while meeting any post conflict requirements with the greatest economy of force possible. This often leads to the impression (amongst other nations, government agencies, IOs, and NGOs)
that the United States either fails to understand or is indifferent to the complexities in nation building. Another factor in this impression is the relative frequency with which the US Army rotates its units and, more importantly, its headquarters that command these units. Each change of headquarters causes a new round of coordination, assessment of personalities, and establishment of trust.
The pending requirements for operations in Iraq also prompted a review of our preparedness to conduct post conflict missions to accomplish nation building. This study developed a mission matrix of 135 primary tasks that must be accomplished to reestablish an Iraqi state. 35 What is especially critical in this study is the requirement for a coordinated interagency process at both the domestic and international level to be in place to effectively accomplish the majority of the tasks. Furthermore, the time horizon for these activities is estimated at several years, which provides yet another opportunity for the Army to stay. The military as the probable lead agent in a post Iraq government must be prepared to effectively coordinate the substantial challenges inherent in managing such an interagency collection.
To be effective our doctrine must be both comprehensive and durable. Current doctrine is inadequate to provide the guidance or authority for US military leaders to effectively lead such a large interagency team. In fact the author of one report writes, "The effectiveness of the United
States military ground forces is substantially reduced because doctrine necessary for implementing a coordinated systemic interagency organization does not exist." 36 With a bias (correctly so) towards warfighting primacy, the Army has minimized doctrine for post conflict operations. This is proving to be shortsighted. Clearly articulated doctrine would serve as the guidepost to organize to lead an interagency team, as well as establishing what policies and/or functions should best be handed off to other government or interagency participants. The studies already completed and the pending experience from Afghanistan and Iraq will provide a body of knowledge from which we can develop necessary doctrinal changes.
As discussed, the Army categorizes most nation building activities as stability operations.
This is probably adequate in terms of the phased nature of how we see operations unfolding.
However the area most in need of change is the Mission Essential Tasks. These tasks operationalize the core competencies of the Army, and serve as the basis for much or our resource allocation. The Army needs to recognize the requirement to conduct substantial longterm operations in post conflict states. Accordingly it is recommended that the Army add a new mission essential task at the operational level. Such a task might be: Conduct sustained post conflict operations to foster stable societies.
FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIONS FOR NATION BUILDING TASKS
The international security environment coupled with the war on terrorism creates significant tension on the US military and the Army in particular to meet all of the challenges presented. Ongoing SSCs in Bosnia and Kosovo, efforts in Afghanistan, the challenge presented by North Korea, the force buildup for operations in Iraq, and the still developing force requirements to support homeland defense and the new Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
have the net effect of employing nearly all the active force component and a significant portion of the reserves and National Guard. Given the pace of deployments in the 1990s there is significant concern that we have pushed the total Army to a state of deployment fatigue.
The requirements in Afghanistan and potential force for "post conflict Iraq" argue for an increase in force structure to meet these demands. Several recent studies by Rand and Dr.
Conrad C. Crane highlight that the issue is not insufficient combat units but rather the specialized units that are in 'low density and high demand" (LD/HD). Such units are military police, civil affairs, engineers, general supply units, and transportation companies. 37 The
Abrams doctrine enacted during the mid 1970s migrated the majority of Army CS and CSS units to the Army Reserve and National Guard. 38 The ongoing number of operations has exposed the imbalance in available forces, particularly many of those in the reserve component, but especially military police and civil affairs units.
There is a substantive volume of study that advocates the establishment of special constabulary forces designed to conduct peacekeeping engagement or stability operations. 39 The idea is that such forces would relieve the strain on military units whose primary mission is combat operations. These forces could primarily be constituted from National Guard or reserve units without endangering U.S. capability to decisively win in two theaters, and conduct a limited number of SSCs. However a comprehensive RAND review of peace operations requirements concluded that creating special units for these missions would be ill advised. 40 The preferred
Army solution is to continue to use combat formations for rotational duty on SSCs. This process works, although at a substantial operational tempo for both active and reserve components.
Perhaps the most succinct statement on these options comes from GEN Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, "We can take a great warfighting formation and retrain it to be a great peacekeeping unit formation in three months and do A-work. To go the other way takes 20
years." 41 The presence of capable ground forces is essential for most post conflict operations in fractured societies. Studies show that administrators in provisional governments, which are attempting to build a stable society, rely on the very specific coercive threat that a fully capable ground combat force provides. 42 The ongoing Army transformation and formation of the Stryker brigades offers some insight into how Army forces may be arrayed for future missions. The inherent mobility, extensive communications and information systems, and large contingent (three battalions of infantry) of combat forces makes these units a potent force for SSC operations.
The most critical force structure change that must occur is to rebalance the types of forces The primary difficulty is that it will take time to develop these units, as they are much like Special
Forces units and present the same manning and sustainment issues. Much of this new structure should be in the active component.
The Army has several processes that are designed to systematically review our force structure needs versus allocation. These include Concepts Analysis studies, the Total Army Analysis (TAA), force design updates (FDU), and Functional Reviews of Branch capabilities.
These processes are driven by our doctrine. A change in doctrine often is the driver to change our force structure allocations. Army transformation is an example of a decision to adjust the way we organize our structure based upon how we look at our missions.
The difficulty of the change process is the requirement for no net growth in the Army. In order to create more of one specialty, there must be a corresponding unit that is decreased.
Short of a force structure increase authorized by Congress, the military and particularly the Army must look internally at readjusting force allocation to create more of these needed LD/HD units. These modifications can be mostly from within existing structure, although changes will require a shift across components. One example of a place to harvest such force structure would be to convert the large number of administrative support personnel (clerk typists) to these necessary LD/HD specialties. 43 Current analysis indicates that the majority of the most pressing unit shortfalls, or extreme operational deployment tempos of some units (such as Military Police units) can be met by relatively small changes to our force structure. In the case of MPs and civil affairs units the additional structure required may necessitate a transfer of some number of combat units to the reserve component. Most of the needed changes can be worked around the margins of our current force structure, but these changes will require hard choices and not be without controversy. The catalyst for such change needs to initiate from the review of our doctrine.
DEVELOPING SKILLED LEADERS FOR NATION BUILDING
A critical subset of developing appropriate force structure for expanded stability operations and particularly nation building requirements is the development of a cadre of knowledgeable and experienced leaders, staff officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Perhaps the most important of these proposals is that the Army should create a program to conduct exchange positions with other government and some selected non-governmental agencies that will be critical participants in the interagency process to conduct nation building requirements. This could be modeled along the lines of the training with industry program.
These individuals could serve one year on the staff of another government agency followed by a two-year assignment on the staff of a division or corps headquarters.
The critical issue to be underscored is that the tasks of nation building are many and complex. The Army would be well served to develop a cadre of officers and NCOs with backgrounds in these task areas who can provide effective coordination, liaison, and depth of experience in conducting the mission.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Army must step up and embrace the requirements to conduct nation building as part of stability operations in a post conflict society. The international security environment and our own domestic safety demand that a more proactive approach be taken to mitigate the problems that failed states can engender on international order. 
CONCLUSION
If military action is necessary, the United States and our allies will help the Iraqi people rebuild their economy, and create the institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq at peace with its neighbors.
? George W. Bush 44 The security environment today demands that the United States must engage itself in building stable societies that rest on the rule of law and within their means become productive members of the international society. The war on terrorism is the acute manifestation of the failure of the international community to address the problems presented by failed states.
The National Security Strategy calls for the development of stable democratic governments as a strategic end within our sphere of vital interests. 45 Nation building thus becomes an acknowledged requirement to achieve this strategic objective.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the imbalance of current American military power occurs not so much in military capabilities to conduct nation building but rather in the reluctance to provide a doctrinal framework to organize these capabilities. Sound doctrine begins with the formulation of mission requirements. Development of sound doctrine will allow DOD to define participation in nation building on its terms and provide sound underpinnings upon which to effectively handle the post-conflict and transition stages. Failure to do so will continue the inefficient allocation and over extension of resources both within DoD and other departments of the U.S. government.
DoD must establish a comprehensive doctrinal basis to describe the requirements to successfully execute nation building, as it must be executed to achieve our national security 
